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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction in this Court rests on Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (e) which vests jurisdiction in this Court to review 
all final orders and decrees in cases originating in the Board 
of State Lands. (The "Board.") 
The proceedings below, before the Board and the 
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the 
"Director" and "Division"), consisted of the filing, 
consideration and approval of an application by Garfield County 
for a land exchange. In that exchange, the County sought to 
acquire a section of State land which had originally been 
granted to the State of Utah under § 6 of the Utah Enabling 
Act, 28 Stat. 107, 109. The section in question is located 
within Capitol Reef National Park. Agency action also 
included: denial of a petition to intervene in the exchange 
proceedings filed by the National Parks and Conservation 
Association ("NPCA," the petitioner); denial of NPCA requests 
to defer decision pending opportunity for investigation; denial 
of certain NPCA requests for declaratory rulings filed under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15, relating to issues raised by the 
exchange proceedings; and issuance of one requested declaratory 
ruling stating certain standards governing the Board or 
Division's decision on the proposed land exchange. 
On September 11, 1987, the Board approved the land 
exchange "in concept," subject to the County's fulfillment of 
certain further conditions. On December 21, 1987, the Director 
of the Division of State Lands and Forestry formally approved 
the exchange; and pursuant to that approval, the Governor 
executed a patent conveying the land to the County on December 
24, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully 
denied NPCAfs request to intervene in proceedings pending 
before the Board and Division on an application by Garfield 
County for approval of a land exchange by which it proposed to 
acquire a State school section within Capitol Reef National 
Park in exchange for certain County lands (the "Capitol Reef 
land exchange"). 
2. Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully 
denied NPCATs procedural requests to defer decision on the 
application pending public notice, access to further 
information, and opportunity to review the Director's reply to 
NPCATs requests for declaratory rulings. 
3. Whether, in response to NPCA's requests for 
declaratory rulings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 65-46a-15, the 
Director of the Division erred in holding that legal standards 
governing decision on the Capitol Reef land exchange required 
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that "when there is a choice between two actions, both of which 
provide some measure of economic benefit to beneficiaries of 
the school trust," decision must prefer the option that will 
generate the "greater economic advantage11 and may not give 
weight to other statutorily-mandated management policies that 
require or permit protection of significant scenic, aesthetic 
and recreational values such as the "multiple use/sustained 
yield" policy of Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and the policies 
against impairment or derogation of national parks prescribed 
by 16 U.S.C.A. § 1 and la-1. 
4. Whether the Board and Director, in approving the 
Capitol Reef laid exchange, erred in failing to make factual 
and legal determinations required by applicable legal 
standards, including those stated in the Director's reply to 
NPCAfs request for declaratory rulings, particularly: 
(a) The failure to determine whether application 
of "trust" management concepts were considered by the Board or 
Director to require approval of the Capitol Reef land exchange, 
and failure to make factual determinations necessary to apply 
those concepts. 
(b) The failure to determine whether, and the 
extent to which, the Capitol Reef section may or must be 
managed to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
values and resources on or proximate to that section in 
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accordance with the "multiple use/sustained yield" principles 
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and/or the nonimpairment 
requirement of the National Park Service Organic Act, as 
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 and la-1 (1974 and West Supp. 1987). 
(c) The failure to determine whether feasible 
management options were available which, without material 
economic disadvantage, through land exchange or other 
administrative disposition, would have permitted or assured 
compliance with protective statutory standards or policies 
applicable to the Capitol Reef section through conveyance to 
the National Park Service in return for acquisition of other 
lands to be managed for economic return. 
(d) The failure to determine the extent to which 
election of management options for the Capitol Reef section 
designed to preserve its scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
values would benefit future members of the open class of trust 
beneficiaries by protecting and preserving long-term trust 
asset values. 
(e) The failure to determine whether management 
designed to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
values on or related to the Capitol Reef section in compliance 
with other protective statutory policies would generate 
sufficient long-term or short-term economic benefit to satisfy 
trust obligations. 
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(f) The failure to give consideration and effect 
to the Board's previously-adopted policies recited in Division 
of State Lands and Forestry, "Surface Policies" (1966 through 
December 1986), including its policy titled "Management of 
Sensitive Areas" (§ 1.600) and its policy titled "Environmental 
Assessments" (§1.400-1.411). 
(g) The failure to determine or resolve other 
material substantive and procedural issues concerning the 
proposed exchange that had been identified by members of the 
Board, Division staff, officials of the U.S. National Park 
Service and others in the course of the exchange proceedings. 
5. Whether the decision to approve the Capitol Reef 
land exchange was unlawfully made or participated in by the 
Board, in violation of this Court's holding in Adkins v. 
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (1986), which determined 
that the Board's statutory power was limited to policy making 
and (with limited exceptions) did not include application of 
policy to specific facts or rendering individual case decisions. 
6. Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully 
declined to respond to certain requests for declaratory rulings 
filed by NPCA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-15 that were 
relevant to the lawfulness of the decision to approve the 
Capitol Reef land exchange. 
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7. Whether the action of the Board and the Division 
approving the Capitol Reef land exchange and the patent 
conveying the Capitol Reef section to the County should be 
invalidated and remanded for proceedings in accordance with law 
if the above issues, or any of them, are determined in favor of 
NPCA. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(1) §6 of Enabling Act 
(2) Art. XX, Utah Constitution 
(3) Utah statute on multiple use, §65-1-14 
(4) National Park Service Organic Act, nonimpairment 
provision, 16 USC §§ 1 and la-1 
(5) Division of State Lands and Forestry, Surface 
Policies, continaing minutes of Board of State Lands meeting 
June 14, 1984 approving §1.600 "Management of Sensitive Areas" 
and minutes of Board of State Lands meeting July 19, 1978 
approving §1.400 "Environmental Assessments". 
(6) In re Declaratory rulings: UCA § 63-46a-15 and 
Board of State Lands procedural rules R632-7-1 through 
R632-7-5, together with definitions appearing in §63-46a-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition Below 
-6-
This case arises on a Petition for Review filed by the 
National Parks and Conservation Association ("NPCA") 
challenging the administrative proceedings and decisions of the 
Board of State Lands (the"Board") and of the Director of the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director" and 
"Division") in approving a land exchange sought in an 
application filed by intervenor Garfield County, Utah (the 
"County"). 
By application dated April 23, 1987, the County sought 
approval of a land exchange by which it proposed to acquire a 
state "school section" within Capitol Reef National Park by 
proffering in exchange certain other land owned by the 
country. (The "Capitol Reef land exchange.") [R. 5-7] On 
September 11, 1987, at a scheduled meeting, but without any 
published or other general public notice of the proposed land 
exchange the Board approved the proposed exchange "in concept," 
subject to certain further proceedings and conditions. [R. 
54] At that meeting an NPCA representative, in written and 
oral statements, presented certain substantive and procedural 
objection to the exchange. NPCA requested deferral of any 
decision pending adequate notice to interested citizens, 
opportunity to obtain information concerning the proposed 
exchange, and opportunity to participate before the Board, with 
appropriate formal administrative proceedings. [R. 41, R. 
52-53] 
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On October 14, 1987, NPCA filed a letter "petition to 
intervene" in the continuing proceedings [R. 61-64], and a 
letter requesting that the Board or Division render certain 
declaratory rulings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 
concerning issues raised by the pending land exchange 
application. [R. 65-71] NPCA further requested that action on 
the exchange be deferred for 30 days following issuance of the 
requested declaratory rulings, to permit it "to file a 
response, identify any factual issues for appropriate 
evidentiary proceedings, and offer applicable legal argument." 
[R. 64] 
On November 16, 1987, the Director of the Division 
denied NPCATs petition to intervene [R. 74-75j. On December 
21, the Director responded to NPCATs requests for declaratory 
rulings, denying or refusing to respond to, all but one of 
NCPA?s nine requests. [R. 83-87] Also on December 21, 1987, 
pursuant to the Board's decision on September 11, 1981, the 
Director took formal action approving the Capitol Reef land 
exchange [R. 89], sub silentio denying NPCATs request that 
final action be deferred pending opportunity respond after 
review of the requested declaratory rulings. On December 24, 
1987, pursuant to the Director's formal approval, the Governor 
executed a patent conveying the Capitol Reef school section to 
the County. 
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2. Statement of the Facts 
A. The Capitol Reef Section: Background and 
Context 
The land that is the subject of this disputed land 
exchange is section 16, T34S, R8#, SLB&M. [R. 5; R. 7] 
acquired by the State of Utah pursuant to the "school section" 
grants effected by § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, 
109 (Act of July 16, 1984). Because Section 16 is located 
within the exterior boundaries established by the legislation 
which created Capitol Reef National Park, 16 U.S.C.A. § 273 
(1974), 85 Stat. 739 (Public Law 92-207, Dec. 18, 1971), it is 
hereafter referred to as the "Capitol Reef section." 
The Capitol Reef section occupies a scenically 
spectacular and strategically critical location with Capitol 
Reef National Park, embracing virtually all of the "Waterpocket 
Fold" at the point where it is traversed, in a series of 
"switchbacks" by the much-disputed dirt road known as the "Burr 
Trail." 
Areas on both the north and south side of the Burr 
Trail where it traverses the Capitol Reef section have been 
recommended by the National Park Service for wilderness 
designation. The areas recommended for wilderness designation 
are the Wagon Box Mesa unit (Unit #2) to the south and the Red 
Canyon unit (Unit #3) to the north [See map titled "Exhibit A, 
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Wilderness Plan, Capitol Reef National Park," copies from 
United States Department of the Interior, National Park 
Service, "Wilderness Recommendation, Capitol Reef National 
Park/Utah" (November 1974). This map appears as pages 36-37 of 
Appendix 7 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement The 
Administrative Record.] 
The recommended Wagon Box Wilderness unit, at its 
north end near the Burr Trail (and Section 16) was described by 
the National Park Service as follows: 
Near the north is the mount of Muley Twist 
Canyon, which has been cut deeply into the rocks 
for 20 tortuous, twisting miles. Twelve miles 
are in this unit. This is excellent hiking 
country. A rainbow of rock colors can be seen 
within its walls-white, red, purple, green, gray, 
brown, and finally yellow where it has cut 
through solid Navajo Sandstone on the way to its 
mouth in Grand Gulch. 
Id. at 31. Access to premier hiking and scenery of Muley 
Twist Canyon is available to Park visitors where that canyon 
cuts through the section and across the Bur Trail, both to the 
north and south. Recognizing both the beauty and vulnerability 
of the area, the Park Service commented: 
This unit is the most outstanding of all four 
wilderness designations, and also the one most 
fragile and susceptible to damage by outside 
influences because of its narrowness. 
Id. at 31. The Park Service also recognized that the Red 
Canyon unit (Unit #3) like unit 2, is ideally suited for 
wilderness backcountrv use . . . .ff Id. at 32. 
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The Capitol Reef section is also strategically 
important in the continuing public dispute concerning Garfield 
County's efforts to pave the "Burr Trail," opposed by NPCA and 
other conservation organizations. Paving of the switchbacks 
that descend the Waterpocket Fold, entirely within the Capitol 
Reef section, has been one of the major focal points of that 
dispute. All of the County Commissioners of Garfield County 
have expressed their intention to press for paving of the 
entire road, including the portion within the Park, although 
the controversy currently has concentrated on the portion of 
the Burr Trail extending west of the Park boundary to Boulder, 
Utah. 
The immediate relevance of the paving dispute to this 
case arises because there are undisputed indications, expressly 
acknowledged by the Board, that a major factor in this land 
exchange was Garfield County's effort to use the Capitol Reef 
section as "leverage" to force Congress to release funds for 
paving that were included in a 1985 appropriation bill, but 
withheld "subject to authorization." Thus, although $8.1 
million was appropriated, the specific condition required 
proponents to obtain a further authorization bill before funds 
would be available for road construction. See H.J. Res. 465, 
131 Cong. Rec. at H12038 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1985) (continuing 
appropriation resolution for fiscal 1986). [Attached as 
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Appendix 3 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Administrative 
Record.] 
The administrative record contains substantial 
indications of the Board's affirmative participation in the use 
of this land exchange to assist Garfield County's efforts in 
using the Capitol Reef section as a ?flever?f to force release of 
the paving monies. 
Most explicitly, in the course of the Board's 
consideration of the exchange proposal, a representative of the 
Wilderness Society observed that --
in an article in the Salt Lake Tribune of 
September 3, it was noted that the land could be 
used as leverage for authorizing the freeing-up 
of the money for paving the Burr Trail.1 
In response, without contest or question by other Board members 
or by the Garfield County Commissioner (who was present), 
Mr. Bates, of the Board, asked if the Wilderness 
Society was willing to go to the people in 
Congress who are blocking the appropriated monies 
and get them released. Garfield County has been 
very up-front with their proposal of why they 
want these lands. They only want to get the road 
paved. [R 53-54] 
In addition to the above, there were other explicit 
indications in the record that the Board's response to the 
1 The article referred to, by Salt Lake Tribune 
reporter Jim Woolf, titled "Garfield Hopes to Land Burr Trail 
Funds by Trading Acres," published Sept. 3, 1987, is included 
as Appendix 8 to Petitioner's Motion To Supplement The 
Administrative Record, in order to provide the context for the 
above comment and the ensuing Board member's response. 
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proposed exchange was strongly influenced by the County's 
political objectives. A memorandum to the Board by the 
Division staff expressly acknowledged that "in several respects 
existing policy does not apply to this proposal." [R. 36] The 
memorandum, as well as Board discussion, repeatedly 
acknowledged conflict with a prior policy, established through 
a "Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") executed by Governor 
Ganberter and by Secretary of the Interior Hodel, designed to 
provide "for the removal of State sections from national parks 
. . . through Federal Land Policy and Management Act exchange 
procedures." [R. 31; R. 34-35; R. 43; R. 46-47; R. 49-53] 
Despite that basic and admitted conflict, the Division Staff 
and the Director repeatedly attempted to justify the policy 
conflict with the MOU on the basis of "assumptions" and 
undocumented representations that the County would eventually 
convey the Capitol Reef section to the Park Service. [R. 34; 
R. 47; R. 49-51; R. 54] 
Finally, the specific involvement of the agencies in 
the County's political maneuvers is revealed by one of the two 
grounds on which the management option of "private sale" was 
rejected. That alternative was expressly rejected not only 
because it would "only provide appraised value," but also 
because it "may prevent effective control by the County . . . 
." [R. 36; R. 49] 
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B. The Initial Agency Proceedings 
By application dated 23 April, 1987, Garfield County 
applied to the Division of State Lands and Forestry for 
approval of a proposed land exchange by which the County would 
acquire Section 16, T34S, R8E, SLB&M (the "Capitol Reef 
section") owned by the State of Utah pursuant to the "school 
section" grants effected by § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28 
Stat. 107, 109. [R. 5; R. 7] In exchange for acquisition of 
that section, the County proposed to convey certain 
County-owned properties. No public notice of the proposed 
exchange, or notice of availability of documents analyzing or 
implementing the exchange, was provided to the public, 
including NPCA.2 
On September 11, 1987, the proposed Garfield County 
land exchange was considered at a scheduled meeting of the 
Board of State Lands. At that meeting, a representative of 
NPCA offered oral and written statements opposing the exchange 
2 NPCA learned of the pending exchange application 
shortly before the Board's meeting on September 11, 1987, 
through review of the agenda of the Utah Resource Development 
Coordinating Committee. The key Division memo dated July 27, 
1987, summarizing and analyzing the exchange [R. 42-54] was 
made available to NPCA, only after repeated requests, in Moab, 
Utah, the evening before the Board meeting. See Affidavit of 
Terri Martin, Appendix A to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement 
the Record. 
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on substantive and procedural grounds. Emphasizing that there 
"has been failure to give adequate notice to the public for its 
opportunity to provide comments/1 [R. 53] NPCA requested that 
consideration of the matter ,Tbe deferred pending appropriate 
notice and opportunity for citizens, including ourselves, to 
obtain further information regarding the proposed exchange.ff 
[R. 41] 
Material substantive and procedural issues concerning 
the proposed exchange were identified at or prior to the 
September 11, 1987, meeting by members of the Board, by the 
Division staff, by NPCA, by officials of the U.S. National Park 
Service and others. [R. 39-41; R. 44; R. 46; R. 54] Without 
addressing or explaining its resolution of any of those issues, 
either on September 11 or in any subsequent meeting or 
document,3 the Board acted to approve the exchange "in 
concept." [R. 54] That decision, however, provided for 
further proceedings on the exchange because the Division staff 
had raised doubt about the propriety of accepting the lands 
proffered in exchange by the County unless those lands 
3 Specific material issues identified in the agency 
proceedings but not explained or resolved by the Board or 
Division are summarized, infra pp. 20-23 under the heading 
"Final approval of the land exchange and failure to state the 
grounds for decision and identified issues" 
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represented greater than "equal value" [R. 49], and the County 
had indicated willingness to identify additional property for 
exchange. [R. 47] Thus, the Board's approval was made 
"subject to further evaluation of the County's offer to ensure 
. . . better that [sic] equal value." [R. 54] 
C. Denial of NPCA's Petition to Intervene 
On October 14, 1987, NPCA filed a letter styled as a 
"petition to intervene" in the still-pending land exchange 
proceeding. [R. 61-64] The petition alleged NPCA's grounds 
for standing and interest in the proceedings, and identified 
certain issues that NPCA sought to pursue as intervenor, 
relating to potential impacts on and protection of Capitol Reef 
National Park. NPCA's petition noted that "the information and 
evidence before the Division and Board is limited to internal 
memoranda and additional information submitted to the Board by 
Garfield County.,f [R. 63] 
NPCA emphasized that it sought to present evidence and 
argument to redress the agencies' failure to consider 
protection of the unique values of Capitol Reef National Park, 
the interest of Utah citizens in preserving those values, and 
the grounds on which protection of the non-economic values of 
the Capitol Reef section would be consistent with maintaining 
the integrity of the state's trust responsibility for those 
lands. [R. 63] NPCA also sought opportunity to respond and to 
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identify disputed factual issues after opportunity to review 
the Director's reply to its simultaneous "requests for 
declaratory rulings" on certain key issues, requesting 30 days 
for that purpose. [R. 64] 
NPCAfs petition to intervene was denied by the 
Director in letters dated November 16, 1987, [R.17; R.18] 
stating the following basis for denial: 
Currently, the Division . . . has no procedures 
under which a request for intervention in the 
consideration of an exchange proposal might be 
granted. In fact, consideration of an exchange 
application by the Division is not viewed as an 
adjudicative action under present law. Rather, 
it is in the nature of a proposal for 
negotiation. . . . At present, we see no basis 
for interjection of a third party into such a 
negotiation process. [R. 74; R. 75] 
In denying petitioner's petition to intervene, the 
Director did not question or contest petitioner's allegations 
concerning its "standing" and interest in the proceedings. 
Advising that "the negotiations are nearly complete," he 
invited NPCA to submit "any information related to the value of 
the affected properties or any alternative which you may have 
to offer." [R. 74; R. 75] He also failed to respond to 
petitioner's requests that decision on the exchange be deferred 
pending opportunity for notice to the public, for 
investigation, and for response in light of the interpretations 
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and policies reflected in the anticipated reply to NPCA's 
requests for declaratory rulings. 
D. Disposition of NPCA?s Requests For 
Declaratory Rulings 
Concurrently with its petition to intervene, on 
October 14, 1987, NPCA also filed certain fTrequests for 
Declaratory Rulings11 with the Board and Division [R. 65-71] 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 and Board of State Lands 
procedural rules R632-7-1 through R632-7-5. The requests for 
declaratory rulings explained the reasons why the rulings were 
needed and sought the agencies' interpretations of statutory 
and/or constitutional requirements and policies on certain 
procedural and substantive issues material to the proposed land 
exchange. Emphasizing the importance of the requested rulings 
to meaningful participation in the exchange proceedings, NPCAfs 
concurrent petition to intervene emphasized that it "cannot 
effectively participate in the pending proceedings or protect 
its rights and interests until determination of the requested 
declaratory rulings." [R. 64] For that reason, NPCA requested 
opportunity to defer further response to the exchange proposal 
until it could review the reply to those requests. [R. 64] 
The Director replied to NPCA's requests for 
declaratory rulings by letter on December 21, 1876 [R. 83-87], 
declining to rule on all but one of the requests. The 
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technical legal grounds for that declination are analyzed and 
challenged at pages 52-55 of this brief. 
E. Declaratory Ruling on Consistency of 
"trust1* Management of Responsibilities With 
Protections of Unique Values on the Capitol 
Reef Section 
Prompted by repeated Board and Division staff 
invocation of a generalized "trust management" obligation to 
maximize revenues from school trust lands [R. 33-34; R. 45-47; 
see also R. 28; R. 58], NPCATs requests for declaratory rulings 
had sought to determine the agencies1 interpretation of the 
legal content of that concept, as applied to the Capitol Reef 
section. 
Specifically referring to the Capitol Reef land 
exchange, NPCATs request for declaratory rulings sought to 
determine --
whether the applicable statutes, rules, board 
policies or other authorities permit or require 
consideration and protection of the unique, 
long-term scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
values of state lands in making decisions 
affecting the disposal of those lands. . . . [R. 
28] 
In particular, declaratory ruling request #7 inquired 
concerning the extent to which management to preserve the 
unique scenic, aesthetic and recreational values and resources 
of the Capitol Reef section may be consistent with the 
agencies' concept of the legal content and effect of any 
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"trust" obligation to generate economic return from the 
management: or disposition of that land. [R. 71, paragraph or 
request #7] 
The Director's reply did provide a declaratory ruling 
setting forth his interpretation of certain "trust management" 
concepts [R. 84-87]. That declaratory ruling is analyzed, and 
challenged in part, in section V.6 of this Brief. 
However, the role or effect of those concepts, as 
interpreted by the Director, on the decision to approve the 
capitol Reef land exchange cannot be determined because no 
meaningful statement of the grounds for decision has ever been 
made available by the Board and Division. Nor have any factual 
determinations ever been provided that resolve, or even 
address, the considerations recited by the declaratory ruling 
as governing the agencies1 "trust" obligations in the context 
of the Capitol Reef land exchange. 
F. Final approval of the land exchange and 
failure to state the grounds for decision 
on identified issues 
The Director took formal action approving the proposed 
exchange on December 21, 1987, expressly acting on the premise 
that "the Board approved the concept of exchanging State land" 
in accordance with the County's proposal. [R. 89] The only 
decision document was a one-page report of the Director's final 
approval, which included a summary of appraised values 
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purporting to show that the County had proffered other or 
additional land sufficient to equal 150% of appraised value of 
the Capitol Reef section. [R. 89] The basis for the latter 
determination is not otherwise reflected in the administrative 
record; nor was it ever noticed or made available to NPCA or to 
the public. 
Thus, no statement of facts and reasons, statement of 
grounds for decision, or other explanation has ever been 
prepared or provided in support of the Board's or Director?s 
decision to approve the Capitol Reef land exchange. Because of 
the failure to provide any meaningful decision document, many 
material substantive and procedural issues that were identified 
in the course of the exchange proceedings were left unresolved, 
and no explanation for their resolution has been made public. 
The need for a meaningful decision document had been 
asserted in a latter dated December 18, 1987, in which NPCA had 
"specifically request[ed] that prior to any approval, you 
address and state the basis for your resolution of the issues 
raised below." Emphasizing that "the exchange raises important 
issues that have not been considered or resolved,,f the letter 
had listed and explained a number of these issues and their 
relevance to the Capitol Reef land exchange. [R. 76-77] 
Although most of the issues presented by NPCA had been raised 
in the declaratory ruling requests and other submissions and 
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questions already before the Board and Division, the Director 
simply declined to respond, on the ground that NPCA's letter 
"was not received until December 24, 1987, . . . three days 
after the approval of the exchange." (The same date that the 
Governor executed a patent deed conveying the Capitol Reef 
section to Garfield County.) 
Furthermore, many of the material issues had been 
identified in the course of the proceedings by members of the 
Board, Division staff, officials of the U.S. National Park 
Service, and others, as well as by NPCA's representative, and 
are reflected in the administrative record. 
The material issues left unresolved by the Director's 
one-page final decision document, discussed in more detail in 
sections of this brief which follow, include: 
(1) Probable impacts on the scenic, aesthetic 
and recreational values and resources of the Capitol Reef 
section and of related areas of Capitol Reef National Park, 
either from the County's development or use of the section [R. 
39; R. 48; R. 50-53], or from successful use of the section as 
"leverage" to force release of funds that Congress had 
authorized but not yet appropriated for paving of the Burr 
Trail. 
(2) Inconsistency of the proposed exchange with 
a comprehensive "Memorandum of Understanding Between The 
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Department of the Interior and The State of Utah" expressly 
designed to implement land exchanges by which the State would 
dispose of unmanageable state school sections within federal 
reservations, and in exchange acquire consolidated and more 
manageable holdings from the Department. (Attached as Appendix 
4 to Motion To Supplement The Administrative Record.) [Issue 
discussed in Administrative Record at, e.g., R. 31-32; R. 
40-41; R. 43; R. 47; R. 50; R. 52; R. 77-78] 
(3) Substantial indications that purposes other 
than benefit to the school trust played a significant role in 
the Board's approval of the exchange. 
(4) The basis for a related, unsupported 
"assumption" that the County eventually intended to turn the 
Capitol Reef section over to the U.S. National Park Service. 
[R. 34; R. 47; R. 49; R. 51] 
(5) The impropriety of the Board's role in the 
specific land exchange decision under this Court's ruling in 
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986). 
[R. 53] 
(6) The impropriety of relying on appraisals 
solicited and submitted by the County rather than obtained or 
conducted independently by the Board and Division. [R. 9; R. 
31; R. 68-69; R. 80] 
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G. Issuance of patent conveying title to the 
Capitol Reef section to Garfield County 
NPCA is informed that a patent to the Capitol Reef 
section was executed by the Governor on December 24, 1987, 
implementing the land exchange as finally approved on December 
21, 1987. Neither a copy of the patent nor any statement, 
recommendation or other transmittals to or by the Governor are 
included in the certified Administrative Record, but have been 
requested in NPCA's accompanying Motion to Supplement The 
Administrative Record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
1. J jurisdiction 
NPCA is confident that this Court has jurisdiction 
over this action, based on the arguments previously submitted 
in response to the State's Motion to Dismiss. Those arguments 
are merely supplemented hereby the submission of an affidavit 
dated April 7, 1988, executed by Professor Ronald N. Boyce, 
attached as Appendix 2 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement 
Administrative Record. 
2. NPCA Was Unlawfully Denied Opportunity for 
Effective Participation in the Capitol Reef Land 
Exchange Proceedings 
A. NPCA's Petition to Intervene was Unlawfully 
Denied 
The Director of the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry unlawfully denied petitioner's request to intervene in 
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pending agency proceedings on the proposed Capitol Reef Land 
Exchange. 
(a) No question was raised about the timeliness 
of petitioner's request to intervene, about the substantiality, 
legal relevance or lack of representation of the interests 
petitioner sought to protect, or about petitioner's standing to 
assert those interests; and where 
(b) The only grounds stated for denial of 
intervention were that the Division "has no procedures'1 for 
intervention in exchange proceedings and that there is "no 
basis for interjection of a third party" into land exchange 
proceedings because they involve a "negotiation process" rather 
than an "adjudicative action." R. 74; R. 75. 
The Director's characterization is directly contrary 
to Utah law on this point. §63-46b-l(a) defines reviewable 
adjudicative proceedings as: 
"all state agency actions that determine the 
legal rights, duties, priviledges, immunities or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons. . . . " 
This definition is consistent with the case law definition 
which preceded the Administrative Procedures Act Adkins v. 
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1986). 
The Director's determination that the Division was 
free to proceed as if it were a private party negotiating a 
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home sale is inconsistent not only with the Division's 
responsibility as a governmental agency, with its own declared 
position regarding petitioner's requests. Contrary to his 
declaration that petitioner had no right to intervene, the 
Director concluded that petitioner had shown sufficient 
interest in the transaction that he was required to respond to 
ruling #7 requested by petitioner [R. 84-87]. 
B. NPCATs Request to Defer Decision Pending 
Opportunity for Notice, Investigation and 
Review of Declaratory Rulings was 
Improperly Denied 
The refusal of the Board and Division to acknowledge 
that they have obligations beyond negotiating a private 
property transaction is particularly offensive in this case 
given the fact that the state land in question is within a 
national park. The important policy questions resulting from 
that fact were brought to the attention of the Board and 
Division before, during, and after the September 11 meeting at 
which the land exchange was approved 'fin concept." Indeed, 
some of the most significant issues raised by this fact were 
identified in the course of the Board's own internal analysis 
of the proposed exchange. That document dated July 27, 1987 
and described in respondent's certification of the record as 
"Division Advisory Briefing Memorandum for Board of State Lands 
and Forestry'' expressly recognizes that the proposed exchange 
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raises issues regarding compliance with the Board's trust 
obligations [R. 33]; regarding conflict with the memorandum of 
understanding between the state and the Department of Interior 
[R. 34]; and regarding conflict with the National Park Service 
regarding impact of the proposed exchange on the National Park 
[R. 35]. Before the exchange was actually made, additional 
issues were brought to respondent's attention, including 
questions regarding the application of the Board's own policy 
statement regarding management of sensitive lands [R. 71]. 
Petitioner requested that these issues be reviewed, with 
opportunity for a full presentation of views, before the 
exchange was carried out [R. 62-64], 
Despite the acknowledged presence of these important 
issues, the Board and Division refused to defer the decision as 
requested and proceeded to conduct the exchange as if they were 
private parties. Agency decisions made in the absence of 
announced, ascertainable standards are invalid under Utah law. 
Athay v. State Dept. of Business Regulations, 626 P.2d 965, 
966-67 (Utah, 1981). This is particularly true here where the 
Board has simply refused to face up to its responsibility to 
weigh, evaluate, and issue the kind of policy decisions which 
are its responsibility under Adkins v. Div. of State Lands, 
719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986). 
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3. The Director's Declaratory Ruling Erred in 
Holding that Management Decisions Affecting the 
Capitol Reef Section Must Prefer Options 
Providing the "Greater Economic Advantage" 
Regardless of Federal or State Statutory 
Policies that Permit or Require Protection of 
Unique Scenic, Aesthetic and Recreational Values 
A. NPCA?s declaratory ruling request on trust 
management obligations 
In initial stages of the land exchange proceeding, the 
posture of the Board and Division carried strong implications 
that legal "trust management" obligations compelled it to base 
decision solely on a determination of whether exchange with 
Garfield County would maximize economic return from the Capitol 
Reef Section [R. 32-36; R. 44-49; R. 54; R. 58] Because that 
position implied that no consideration could or would be given 
to the potential impacts of the exchange on the scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values of that section or of Capitol 
Reef National Park, NPCA sought to clarify the Board and 
Director's interpretation of those "trust" obligations through 
its declaratory ruling requests. Request #7 sought a ruling 
determining whether, under applicable law --
decisions concerning the management, retention 
and disposal of the state section . . . may 
properly give preference to protection of 
significant scenic, aesthetic, and recreational 
values where such decisions may foreclose or 
reduce prospects for greater monetary returns. . 
. . [R. 71] 
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The ruling request further sought to be advised of the extent 
to which and the circumstances in which the Board or Division --
will protect or preserve significant scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values . . . (a) where 
. . . decisions that may maximize monetary return 
are likely to diminish, impair or destroy those 
values; or (b) where . . . decisions involving 
greater immediate or short-term monetary return 
may foreclose or reduce prospects for longer-term 
monetary benefits [from protecting those 
values]. [R. 71] 
B. The Director's declaratory ruling on trust 
management obligations 
In response to NPCA's declaratory ruling request #7, 
the Director determined that NPCA had demonstrated a sufficient 
stake in resolution of the Capitol Reef land exchange to 
justify a response. Recognizing NPCATs interest in the 
preservation or destruction of scenic, aesthetic and 
recreational values, he concluded that "the relationship 
between the feared impacts and NPCA's proferred [sic] interests 
is sufficiently articulated to enable a limited ruling." [R. 
85] 
The Director purported to limit his ruling to Utah 
Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and other authorities only to the extent 
necessary to determine the applicability of that section [R. 
85], because NPCATs request had specifically identified only 
that statute, together with "other applicable statutes, 
constitutional provisions, rules or policies" that may govern 
-29-
protection of scenic, aesthetic and recreational values. [R. 
71] The request was cast in those terms, however, because the 
Division and board documents referring to the "trust 
obligation" or duty to maximize economic return had not 
identified specific statutory or constitutional sources in 
asserting that obligation. 
In any event, although the Director purported to limit 
the scope of his ruling, it specifically and without 
qualification asserted his interpretation of the provisions of 
the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution as they define the 
source and reach of a "trust obligation" to maximize economic 
return. 
Although the Director's reply to NPCA's ruling against 
#7 is not free from ambiguity, it may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Lands acquired by the State under the 
"school section" grants in § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28 
Stat. 107, 109, were granted for the support of the public 
schools and, pursuant to Article XX of the Utah Constitution, 
are held in trust for that purpose. As a trust asset, those 
lands must be managed consistently with the trust purpose. 
Although no specific standards are prescribed by law, 
management of those trust lands must be consistent with the 
trust purpose, which may not be subordinated to other 
objectives. 
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(2) "School sections,Tf including the Capitol 
Reef section, may be managed in accordance with other 
applicable law so long as management is consistent with the 
Enabling Act purpose. Thus, "multiple use and sustained yield" 
concepts prescribed by U.C.A. § 65-1-14 are applicable to 
school trust lands including the Capitol Reef section, and 
provide for management designed to preserve and protect 
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values so long 
as such management is consistent with the Enabling Act purpose 
of providing support for the public schools by realizing 
economic advantage from trust lands. 
(3) because the trust obligation runs to an 
"open class" which includes future as well as present 
beneficiaries, the trustee's duty includes conservation of 
trust asset value to assure that present class members are not 
unduly benefited at the expense of future class members. 
Protection of non-economic values on trust lands, therefore, 
will be consistent with trust requirements to the extent that 
protective management properly serves to conserve trust asset 
value for future class members. 
(4) Management for protection of scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values is permissible, and may even 
be required, where those values support or are essential to 
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generating economic benefits from state school trust lands, 
including the Capitol Reef section. 
(5) However, when there is a choice between two 
actions, both of which provide some measure of economic benefit 
to the school trust, management decisions may not prefer the 
more protective option unless the Board or Director determines, 
in their discretion, that it will generate the "greater 
economic advantage." 
C. Only an Explicit, Factually-Demonstrable 
Conflict With Trust Obligations Can Justify 
Overriding Protective Statutory Policies 
NPCA submits that the latter aspect of the Director's 
interpretation of the trust obligation cannot be the law. 
In an appropriate case, NPCA would contest those 
aspects of the Director's ruling suggesting that other 
statutory policies may never take priority over concepts of 
trust management under the Enabling Act. For purposes of this 
case, however, it is necessary for NPCA to challenge only the 
last element of his interpretation. 
It is apparently the Director's position that even if 
substantial economic benefits would arise from management 
policies designed to protect unique scenic, aesthetic and 
recreational values, and even if those protective policies are 
authorized or mandated by federal or state statutes of general 
application, the Board or Director may not select the more 
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protective management option unless it will also generate "the 
greater economic advantage." Thus, under the Director's 
ruling, even statutory protective policies that would generate 
substantial economic gains may not be preferred or applied 
unless they happen to coincide with the Board's or Director's 
discretionary views of the "greater economic advantage." 
Under this approach, then, even mandatory federal 
policies against "impairment" or "derogation" of the purposes 
and resources of national parks, proscribed by 16 U.S.C. § 1 
and la-1, must apparently be disregarded if the Board or 
Director, in their discretion, decide that greater economic 
advantage lies in disregarding those policies. Similarly, 
under the Director's view of the "trust obligation," the 
"multiple use/sustained yield" policies of Utah Code Ann. § 
65-1-14, which ordinarily would call for special protection of 
significant non-economic values, may play no role in the choice 
of management strategies. 
This approach claims too much discretion for the Board 
or Director acting as "trustee". Statutory requirements that 
ordinarily control and limit the scope of agency authority may 
be rendered ineffectual by the agencies' unexplained 
determination that compliance with statutory standards may not 
yield the "greater economic advantage." 
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NPCA submits that the Director's interpretation of 
the trust obligation cannot be the law. The duty of faithful 
management of state school lands cannot, through generalized 
claims of uncontrolled administrative discretion, be converted 
to a device for self-administered exemption from valid 
legislative policies. 
Statutory standards that provide for or require 
protection of unique or significant values on state lands must 
be interpreted as creating a legislative presumption that the 
long-term value of the land exceeds any other economic return 
that may be extracted from it. For that reason, NPCA questions 
whether trust duties in the management of state school sections 
may ever be permitted to override lawful statutory standards 
otherwise applicable to those lands. 
At a minimum, however, if the presumption in favor of 
statutory policies is ever to be overridden, the agencies 
acting as trustee must be required to identify an explicit, 
factually- demonstrable conflict between statutory provision 
for resource protection and the obligations of trust 
management. In the absence of such a clear conflict, there can 
be no legitimate basis for disregarding statutory protections. 
(1) Valid statutory policies and other 
trust obligations provide for 
protection of the significant scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values of 
the Capitol Reef Section 
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(a) Under national park protection legislation 
The significant scenic, aesthetic or recreational 
values of the capitol Reef section were recognized and embraced 
by statutory protection in 1971, when Congress included the 
section "within the boundary generally depicted on the map" 
establishing the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park. 16 
U.S.C.A. § 273 (1974), 85 Stat. 739 (Public Law 92-207, Dec. 
18, 1971). Inclusion within a national park obviously 
constituted recognition that it is among "the most outstanding 
natural and scenic outdoor areas" in the country. House 
Conference Report No. 92-685, 92 Cong. 1st Sess., 1971 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2278, at 2280. That recognition was 
emphasized by the park Service's subsequent wilderness 
recommendations for the area. See supra, page 10-11. 
Under the same statute's recognition of "valid 
existing rights," of course, the state retained its Enabling 
Act rights in the Capitol Reef section. But its inclusion 
within a unit of the National Park System embraced it, with 
adjacent lands, within the statutory protections of the 
National Park Service Organic Act, which provides for 
regulation of the use of national parks in conformity with 
their "fundamental purpose:" 
to conserve the scenery and the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 
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manner and by such means as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations. 
16 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1974) (Act of Aug. 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535.) 
That protection, made applicable to all units of the National 
Park System, 16 U.S.C.A. § lc (1974), was further expanded by 
1978 amendments which made the regulatory purpose explicit and 
of broad application. 
The 1978 amendments to Organic Act provided that "the 
protection, management, and administration of these areas shall 
be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of 
the National Park System," and that activities in park units 
shall not be authorized "in derogation of the values and 
purposes for which these various areas have been established." 
16 U.S.C.A. § ia-1 (West Supp. 1987). Furthermore, the broad 
reach of that amendment was emphasized by its legislative 
history. Without contest from dissenting senators, the key 
committee report explicitly indicated that the amendment was 
designed to resolve legal disputes about "competing private and 
public values" not only in the parks but in surrounding areas: 
This restatement of these highest principles of 
management is also intended to serve as the basis 
for any judicial resolution of competing private 
and public values and interests in the areas 
surrounding Redwood National Park and other areas 
of the National Park System. 
S.Rep. No. 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1977). 
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Finally, these provisions have been recognized as 
having protective effect beyond the formal boundaries of the 
Parks, at least within in-holdings inside the parks' exterior 
boundaries. Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Assoc, v. Watt, 711 
F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983) (sustaining regulations that barred 
uncertificated, out-of-park canoe rental agencies from 
utilizing county or state roads to launch canoes within the 
exterior boundaries of Ozark National Scenic Riverways); 
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(sustaining regulations that barred hunting on waters within 
Voyageurs National Park in which Minnesota claimed ownership or 
concurrent jurisdiction and on which state law expressly 
continued to permit hunting). 
(b) Under Utah's multiple-use/sustained yield 
policy 
There can be no doubt that the Utah Legislature 
intended that multiple-use/sustained yield principles would 
govern management of school trust lands, for it specifically 
provided in § 65-1-14 that those principles would govern, so 
far as "consistent with school trust responsibilities." On the 
face of the statute, it is plain that multiple use principles 
to be adhered to unless they are shown to be inconsistent with 
"school trust obligations". 
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There can also be little doubt that principles of 
"multiple use/sustained yield," as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 
65-1-1-4, provide for protection of unique and significant 
lands of park quality as part of the "combination" of uses 
"that will best meet the present and future needs of the people 
of Utah." Since there is no hint that park uses are not among 
those to be so managed, the Board or Division would have to 
offer a substantial justification for different treatment of 
lands already recognized by Congress as qualifying for national 
park protection. 
That obvious conclusion is directly supported by the 
Director's Declaratory Ruling on NPCAfs request #7. He 
explicitly acknowledges that the requirement of multiple use --
suggests that the management and use of scenic, 
aesthetic, and recreational resources on State 
land might be granted status equal to economic 
considerations in regard to the particular 
Section 16, based on the statutory definition of 
multiple-use/sustained yield. [R. 86; R. 87] 
(Emphasis added.) 
While the Director then interposes his views of the trust 
obligation, he does not otherwise question the protection of 
the Capitol Reef section under the multiple-use principles of 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14. 
(c) A common law "trust obligation" to 
protect unique natural values for the 
benefit of the public imposes a burden 
of specific justification for disposal 
decisions 
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In his influential 1970 article "The Public Trust 
Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention," 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (hereafter, Sax), 
Professor Joseph L. Sax traced the development of 
judicially-developed concepts of a "public trust doctrine" 
which he found emerging in response to the environmental 
problems created by "inconsistency in legislative response and 
administrative action." Sax at 474. 
While Professor Sax did not purport to find a rigorous 
and specific legal doctrine protecting public lands and 
resources, he did explore a wide range of examples of judicial 
skepticism toward government disposition of public interest 
lands for the benefit of limited classes of beneficiaries. 
Drawing from the celebrated public trust case of Illinois 
Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), 
which had applied the doctrine to invalidate a deed to the Lake 
Michigan water front originally granted by the Illinois 
legislature, Sax found in that case "the central substantive 
thought in public trust litigation:" 
When a state holds a resource which is available 
for the free use of the general public, a court 
would look with considerable skepticism upon any 
governmental conduct which is calculated either 
to reallocate that resource to more restricted 
uses or to subject public uses to the 
self-interest of private parties. 
Sax at 490. 
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Pursuing that "model of judicial skepticism," Sax 
found that: developed case law had taken positions requiring 
clear and explicit justification for disposition of public 
interest lands -- very like NPCATs contention here that 
protective statutory standards must be respected in the absence 
of a demonstrable conflicts between resource protection and the 
specialized "school trust" obligation. Thus, for example, he 
found that: the Massachusetts court had developed a rule "that a 
change in the use of public lands is impermissible without a 
clear showing of legislative approval," Sax at 492, citing, 
e.g., Gould v. Gaylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 
215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). Based on that initial requirement, he 
found that the Massachusetts Court in Gould and subsequent 
cases --
has penetrated one of the very difficult problems 
of American government -- inequality of access 
to, and influence over, administrative agencies. 
Sax at 498. He found that the Court had followed up in 
subsequent: cases that imposed a rigorous standard requiring 
explicit legislative authorization for any administrative 
actions invading the public interest in public preserves. Id. 
at 498 - 502, detailing the holdings in Robbins v. Department 
of Public Works, Mass. , 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969), and 
Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 
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478 (1967). And Sax found an essentially parallel development, 
involving sophisticated and intensive scrutiny of 
agency-proposed projects that may invade publicly-used lands or 
waters, in the Wisconsin and California case law. Sax at 
509-524 and 524-546. 
While he concludes that the courts will not 
necessarily hold such dispositions illegal per se, Sax 
emphasizes that 
they do want to know what public purpose 
justifies them, and they want to put legislatures 
and administrators on notice that such 
dispositions will be closely scrutinized and must 
be reasonably justifiable in terms of the public 
benefits to be achieved. 
Sax at 564. 
The "public trust" law continues to develop in 
response to the continuing and accumulating conflicts between 
protection of public preserves and the commodity demands of a 
consumptive society. Thus, in 1983, the California Supreme 
Court confronted a classic example of those conflicts which, 
like this case, involved an important clash between 
preservation of scenic and ecological values and administrative 
application of traditional legal doctrines supporting 
consumptive use of resources. 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine 
County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, 
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718-724, 729 (Sup. Ct. Calif., en banc, 1983) pitted the unique 
scenic beauty and ecological values of Mono Lake against the 
traditional exercise of water appropriation doctrines, 
administered through the agency of the California Water 
Resources Board. Recognizing both the important protective 
policies underlying the public trust doctrine and the need for 
exercise of legislative authority to permit diversion of water 
for public purposes, the Court took a position very like that 
urged by NPCA in this case: 
Approval of such diversion without considering 
public trust values, however, may result in 
needless destruction of those values. 
Accordingly, we believe that before state courts 
and agencies approve water diversions, they 
should consider the effect of such diversions 
upon interests protected by the public trust, and 
attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize 
any harm to those interests. 
33 Cal.3d 4 , 658 P.2d at 712. Reviewing the substantial 
body of California case law, the Court emphasized that even the 
private beneficiaries of state conveyances of trust lands take 
their interest "subject to the public trust." 658 P.2d at 
722-23. While the Court recognized that the California Water 
Board could validly approve the contested water appropriations, 
it emphasized that --
the state has an affirmative duty to take the 
public trust into account in the planning and 
allocation of water resources, and to protect 
public trust uses whenever feasible . . . 
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and that no official body --
has ever determined the impact of diverting the 
entire flow of the Mono Lake tributaries into the 
Los Angeles Aqueduct . . . [or] whether some 
lesser taking would better balance the diverse 
interests. 
658 P.2d 728. On that basis, the Court held the public trust 
doctrine permitted both administrative and judicial 
reconsideration and reallocation of prior water allocations 
based on consideration of "the impact of water diversion on the 
Mono Lake environment." 33 Cal.3d at 729, 658 P.2d at 729. 
Whether viewed as setting a rigorous standard for 
protection of public land values, or as a guide to rigorous 
judicial skepticism, the underlying policies of the public 
trust are clearly not met in this case. Those policies cannot 
be satisfied by the Board and Director's vague assertions of 
"school trust" obligations, particularly where offered without 
any meaningful or specific statement of the basis for 
decision. Nor can they be met while failing to consider the 
statutory standards specifically protecting our national parks, 
or state multiple use policies designed to facilitate 
protection of the public's interest in those lands. 
Finally, in view of the Board's disregard of its own 
previously-adopted statement on "Management of Sensitive 
Areas," and its disregard of the Governor's own Memorandum of 
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Understanding, designed to facilitate exchanges between the 
State and Interior Department that would protect national park 
values, it is obvious that the Board's decision to convey the 
Capitol Reef section to Garfield County did not fulfill the 
Board's duty to protect public trust lands "whenever feasible." 
(2) The Director's interpretation is not 
required by the established case law on 
"trust" obligations for the management of 
state school sections 
Ironically, Article XX, §1 of the Utah Constitution, 
on which the Director relies for his confining interpretation 
of "school trust" obligations, may actually be the appropriate 
basis for recognition of a broader "public trust" duty, at 
least requiring that Board decisions respect the public 
interest in unique noneconomic values on state school sections 
"whenever feasible." While § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act 
unquestionably requires careful "trust" administration of funds 
derived from the school lands, Article XX imposes a generalized 
trust concept that fairly imports a general duty to protect the 
public interest in lands acquired from Congress: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may 
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress . 
. are hereby accepted, and declared to be public 
Lands of the State; and shall be held in trust 
for the people, to be disposed of as may be 
provided by law, for the respective purposes for 
which they have been or may be granted, donated, 
devised or otherwise acquired. (emphasis added) 
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Utah Const, art. XX, § 1. 
Exploring the prospects for application of school 
trust concepts compatibly with protection of noneconomic 
environmental values, Professor McCormack has pointed out that 
the acceptance of public lands ffin trust for the people11 "could 
be read to grant the state flexibility to use school lands in a 
broad public trust fashion, including nonrevenue uses, so long 
as the lands are disposed of "as may be provided by law." On 
that basis, then, his interpretation "would distinguish between 
the duty owed the school fund following disposition and the 
duty owed the public while the lands remain in state 
ownership." W. McCormack, "Land Use Planning and Management of 
State School Lands," 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525, at 532. 
McCormack goes on to show that the confining case law 
on which the Board and Director may be expected to rely deals 
almost exclusively with disposal of trust lands, or income 
from trust lands, for nonschool purposes. Id., citing the 
Supreme Court's holdings in Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 
41 (1919) and Lassen v. Arizona Highway Department, 385 U.S. 
458 (1967). 
A more recent case to the same effect is State v. 
University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981). The 
provocation for the case involve management of school section 
lands within a state park to deny a development right-of-way. 
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But that focus was changed by the University- beneficiary's 
intervention with a declaratory judgment claim challenging the 
validity of the action of the Alaska legislature in 
appropriating the land for a state park without land exchange 
or other compensation. 624 P.2d at 810. The Court's holding, 
then, like Lassen and Ervien, was clearly based on the the 
uncompensated disposal of trust lands. 
A recent Colorado District Court case, drawing from an 
1893 Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of a state 
constitutional obligation similar to the Utah "trust" concepts, 
has held that the constitutional obligation for the Colorado 
State Board of T and Commissioners to maximize financial return 
does not overriJe the state's Mined Land Reclamation Act. 
Under a provision of that Act requiring conformity with local 
zoning regulations, a mine operator was denied permission to 
expand a mining operation on leased state land because the 
local county determined that the expanded mining would violate 
its zoning ordinance. Wesley D. Conda, Inc. v. Colorado Mined 
Land Reclamation Board, et al. (Case No. 86CV2812, Dist. Ct., 
City and County of Denver, decided 26 Jan. 1988), relying on 
In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 P. 986 (1893). 
Unlike Art. XX of the Utah Constitution, the Colorado 
constitutional provision at issue in these cases expressly 
provides that it is the duty of the land commissioners to 
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ffsecure the maximum possible amount" for state lands acquired 
from the United States. Colo. Const. Art. IX, § 10. But the 
same provision also provides, like the similar Utah provision, 
that the Commissioners1 duties are to be exercised "under such 
regulations as may be prescribed by law." Relying on that 
constitutional recognition that statutory requirements may 
regulate the exercise of the land management duties, both 
Colorado decisions recognized that statutory controls could be 
exercised so long as they did not seek to oust the agency's 
ultimate control of the power of disposition of the state lands. 
On review of the case law, McCormack properly 
concludes that even where the state retains trust lands, 
there is little in the [Lassen] opinion to 
indicate that the state cannot define "fair 
market" by reference to land use planning goals. 
The whole concept of zoning and land use planning 
presupposes that land values are affected by 
planning decisions. . . . 
1982 Utah L. Rev. 537. 
In the context of the Capitol Reef land exchange, this 
point is well taken: none of the trust cases invalidate 
interim management programs which may give weight or preference 
to the protection of noneconomic values. None questions the 
propriety of comprehensive, calculated policies such as that 
reflected in the Utah-Interior Department MOU which, if 
implemented, would eliminate conflicts between protected 
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national park lands and income production on school trust 
lands. Furthermore, none of the cases even raises doubt about 
the propriety of proper planning for protection of noneconomic 
values on unique school trust lands where conducted as part of 
a comprehensive program designed to protect those values as an 
inducement for tourist or other income producing activities on 
trust lands outside the protected area. 
Finally, McCormack properly points out that, far from 
a violation of trust responsibilities --
noneconomic management of school sections could 
be asserted as a duty owed to the public school 
system in some instances. Particular sections 
may have historical values that should be 
preserved to give future generations of school 
children the opportunity to observe land and the 
life it supports in a natural setting. . . . 
[Tjhose arguments . . . are not far removed from 
the duty of any trustee to conserve trust assets 
in a prudent fashion. When reinforced by . . . 
the Utah Constitution, which accepts state lands 
1
 in trust for the people,' those arguments 
illustrate the potential breadth of management 
obligations. 
1982 Utah L. Rev. 537-38. Obviously, that concept of an 
affirmative duty to preserve unique lands for their special 
value for future generations is significantly strengthened 
where the land in question was specifically included by 
Congress in national park lands set aside to be conserved 
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"unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1 (1974). 
(3) Application of statutory standards to limit 
the scope of agency discretion should not 
be abandoned because the agency 
characterizes itself as a "trustee" 
Although both state and federal statutory standards, 
applied with rigor under the oversight of public trust 
concepts, would provide for agency protection of the unique 
values of the Capitol Reef section, the Director's ruling lays 
claim to a maze of "discretionary" judgments that would 
pre-empt those statutory protections. He recognizes that 
protection may be appropriate where discretionary judgments 
find the protective management. Protective management may also 
be appropriate where discretionary judgments find that 
long-term "asset value" will be enhanced for future class 
members. Finally, the Director's ruling would overlay those 
wide-ranging judgments with yet another crucial discretionary 
judgment -- as to "greater economic advantage" -- for only with 
that finding would statutory protections of noneconomic public 
land values be given effect. 
Despite the pre-emptive effect of this wide-ranging 
claim of discretion, the Director offers virtually no hint of 
the specific considerations that may weigh in favor or against 
any of the critical findings. Furthermore, that unconfined, 
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unstructured, unchecked discretion would apparently be 
exercised in the same manner as the Board's decision in the 
instant case: without findings or reasons that address either 
the statutory requirements or the discretionary considerations 
that govern particular decisions. 
So far as may be discerned from the Board's decision 
or the Director's decisions in either the land exchange or 
declaratory ruling matters, the sole justification for this 
extraordinary claim of supervening discretionary power lies in 
the contention that the Board (or the Director) must exercise 
the role of "trustee" under the "trust obligation" imposed on 
the relevant land manager by the Utah Enabling Act. 
Furthermore, as is more fully demonstrated in the sections 
which follow, this approach is adopted in a context in which 
virtually any rational choice in preferring one approach over 
the other is hidden and thus invulnerable to meaningful review 
or testing. 
4. Neither the Board Nor the Director Made 
Factual or Legal Findings or Determinations 
Necessary to Support Their Decision to 
Approve the Capitol Reef Land Exchange 
As this court pointed out in Milne Truck Lines v. 
Public Service Commn., 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah, 1986), 
administrative agencies cannot discharge their statutory 
responsibilities without: 
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. . . making findings of fact on all necessary 
ultimate issues under the governing statutory 
standards. It is also essential that the 
Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient 
detail that the critical subordinate factual 
issues are highlighted and resolved in such a 
fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical 
and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. 
The importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a 
proper determination by an administrative 
agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached. 
The record in this case shows no explanation 
whatsoever explaining the Board or Division's reasons for 
giving this land to the county. As has been shown above, the 
fact that the land in question lies within a national park 
raises a set of legal and policy issues. This land is subject 
to unique statutory, administrative, and policy 
considerations. That backdrop of legal protection; coupled 
with the proposition that the Board and Division's trust 
obligations ought to make them highly skeptical about giving 
away trust lands to further the short term objectives of 
politically influential special interest groups; require some 
statement of the basis for these decisions and actions. 
The refusal of either the Board or Division to give 
any such explanation is particularly offensive in this case 
because as those entities proceeded, petitioner expressly and 
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repeatedly brought to their attention those issues which they 
have simply refused to address. 
5. The State Land Board Unlawfully Made or 
Participated in the Decision to Approve the 
County's Application for this Land Exchange 
As has been demonstrated above, the administrative 
record is virtually silent regarding what basis the Board or 
Division actually relied on in deciding to give Garfield County 
the land it requested. The record does show, however, that the 
only decision reflected in the record is that of the Board 
rather than the Division. The reasonable inference to be drawn 
from this reccd is simply that the Board mandated the decision 
to give this land to the county, and the Board allowed it to do 
so. Once again, the Board and Division have reversed the roles 
they are empowered to perform under their enabling 
legislation. Adkins, supra. 
6. The Director Unlawfully Declined to Respond 
to NPCA's Requests for Declaratory Rulings 
On October 14, 1987, petitioner requested that the 
Board or Division render nine declaratory rulings. [R. 
65-71]. Three days before causing the land in question to be 
deeded to the county, the Division's director responded to 
request No. 7 and declined to respond to all the other 
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requests. [R. 83-87] In responding to request No. 7, the 
director conceded that: 
With respect to request No. 7, the NPCA asserts 
substantial interest without specifying what 
those interests are. However, with the 
accompanying Petition for Intervention, the NPCA 
asserts with some particularity those injuries it 
fears will be associated with the proposed land 
exchange. Thus, although the form of the 
petition is not in strict compliance with Rule 
R632-7-4, NPCA has provided adequate information 
relative to NPCAfs stake in the resolution to 
allow a review of applicability to some extent. 
R. 84, fifth paragraph. 
The director then reviews in his next three paragraphs 
petitioner's statement of its interests expected to be 
adversely affected by the proposed exchange concluding: 
". . . the relationships between the feared 
impacts and NPCA's proffered interests is [sic] 
sufficiently articulated to enable a limited 
ruling/1 R. 85 
In direct, and inexpliable contradiction, the director 
claims in this same letter that he need not respond to requests 
1 thru 6 because petitioner ". . . has provided inadequate 
information to assure that responses to the requests are 
necessary to protect or preserve NPCA's rights, status, or 
legal relationships.f? [R. 84] These requests appear at record 
pages 66-70, and petitioner contends that they may be fairly 
summarized as requesting the Board and Division to subject 
themselves to the discipline of objectively reviewing the 
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September 11 Board decision approving the exchange "in 
concept'1, given the apparent inconsistency of that decision 
with the reasoning of Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 
supra, or with §65-1-14 Utah Code. Petitioner's interest in 
these issues is indistinguishable from its interest in the 
issue framed by request No. 7. In each case, petitioner's 
interest is the protection of national park lands from damage 
resulting from an ill considered and unlawful transfer 
apparently intended to serve short term political goals. 
Petitioner's requests 8 and 9 sought certain further rulings 
"in connection with the rulings requested in paragraph 7". [R. 
71]. This paragraph is identified as request No. 7 in the 
director's December 21, 1987 response to these requests [R. 84] 
and is referred to as request No. 7 throughout this brief. 
While implicitly conceding that petitioner's interest in the 
issues raised by these requests is indistinguishable from its 
interest in the subject of request No. 7, the director declined 
to respond to these requests. 
Requests 8 and 9 asked the Division and Board to 
evaluate and determine what weight ought to be given, in 
analyzing the requested transfer, to the Board's policy 
statement regarding "management of sensitive areas" (adopted 
June 14, 1984, Appendix J to Petition for Review) and 
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environmental assessments'1 (adopted July 19, 1978, Appendix K 
to Petition for Review). 
The director responded to these requests, first by 
denying that "the Division" has any Surface Policy document !t. 
. . providing for either management or sensitive areas or 
environmental assessments." [R. 84, third paragraph] The 
director then claimed that even if a Surface Policy document 
did exist, such a policy could not be the subject of a 
declaratory ruling because the policies are not statutes, 
rules, or orders. [R. 84, fourth paragraph] 
The Surface Policy documents which appear as 
appendices J and K to the Petition for Review show that each 
was a policy recommended by the Division staff to the Board and 
unanimously approved by the Board. These types of policy 
determinations are the proper function of the Board as 
explained in Adkins, supra. 
The director's overly technical construction of 
§63-46a-15 is expressly refuted by the definitions which appear 
in §63-46a-2. §63-46a-2(10)(b) states: "A policy is a rule if 
it conforms to the definition of a rule." §63-46a-2(13)(a) 
defines a rule as an agency's written statement which has the 
effect of law, implements a legal mandate, and applies to a 
class of persons. Given the role of the Board and Division as 
interpreted and explained by the Adkins case, these written, 
formally adopted policies meet that definition. 
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7. The Conveyance Pursuant to Invalid Agency 
Action Should be Rescinded, and Proceedings 
Should be Remanded With Instructions 
§65-1-70, Utah Code, authorizes Utah's Governor to 
execute and deliver patents pertaining to the state's lands 
upon request of the Division of State Lands. This 
authorization is, of course, conditioned on a lawful request 
from the Division. A conveyance of real property by a state is 
only valid if done with proper authority. Cf State Land Board 
v. Heuker, 548 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ore. 1976); State v. Hatch, 
342 P.2d 1103 (Utah, 1959); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah 
Pioneers, 197 P 2d 497 (Utah, 1948). 
As has been demonstrated above, this transfer lacked 
proper authority and should be rescinded. 
DATED this 30th day of June, 1988. 
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